EVIDENTIARY WISDOM AND BLINDERS IN

PERSPECTIVE: THOUGHTS
ON MISJUDGING
Elaine W. Shoben*
Empirical studies serve to enlighten the law, even when they simply confirm the wisdom of existing rules. Chris Guthrie' s article, Misjudging,' primarily serves that useful function - confirming the wisdom of existing rules even though the author sought to establish something different. Guthrie's article applies insights from cognitive psychology to the resolution of legal disputes and presents some empirical proof of the effect of the application. He
concludes that three sets of "blinders" - informational, cognitive, and attitudinal - affect the ability of judges to reach correct resolutions of disputes. 2 He
therefore recommends further appreciation of the ability of arbitration and
mediation to avoid some of the pitfalls of "misjudging" the blinders cause.3
The theme of this response is that the studies Guthrie reports and cites
have an implication that undercuts his conclusion. Specifically, his studies are
more consistent with a litigation model4 where juries rather than judges decide
facts. The reason is that they confirm the wisdom of some common law rules
of evidence that protect fact-finding juries from certain types of information.
Although Guthrie does not focus on juries, his article reaffirms as empirically
justified the common law rules that protect juries from certain types of information. This response will focus on two rules: the introduction of repair evidence
and the prohibition against per diem arguments in some jurisdictions. 5
Guthrie's discussion of cognitive blinders in particular confirms the desirability of a system that restricts the access of fact-finders to certain kinds of
information, Because juries are ideally suited for making decisions on the basis
of restricted information, Guthrie's article gives credibility to this aspect of
traditional litigation rather than supports his rejection of it. His conclusion that
this research lends greater credibility to alternative models of dispute resolution
* Judge Jack & Lulu Leyman Professor, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of
Nevada, Las Vegas; Edward W. Cleary Professor Emeritus, University of Illinois College of
Law.
1 Chris Guthrie, Misjudging, 7 NEV. L. J. 420 (2007).
2

Id.

3 Id.

4 This article uses the artificial distinction between "litigation models" and "alternative
models" in the same limited context in which Misjudging addresses issues of fact-finding.
But see Jean R. Sternlight, ADR Is Here: PreliminaryReflections on Where it Fits in a
System of Justice, 3 NEV. L.J. 289 (2003) (explaining the interrelationship of types of dispute
resolution and noting that the distinction between litigation and alternatives is an artificial
one).
I See infra text accompanying notes 37-41.
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is therefore not justified. Although Guthrie is correct that the research supports
one model of alternative dispute resolution - nonevaluative mediation - it does
not support the rejection of traditional litigation on these grounds alone.
Moreover, Guthrie's entire concept of "misjudging" on the basis of these
psychological fallacies is not always well-founded. In the context of informational blinders, the concept does not appear to be premised on achieving just
results, but ones predicted by the application of exclusionary rules. When the
rules have other goals besides justice between these two parties, is it "misjudging" to reach the correct result in the individual case once the cat is out of the

bag? Ironically, Guthrie's concept of "blinder" is used incorrectly in these situations; it is the fact-finder who has a blinder forced by the rule. When the
blinder is off, should the fact-finder be forbidden to see? Guthrie assumes so
and calls it "misjudging" when the fact-finder relies on evidence that is forbidden - but probative.
Cognitive blinders present a different challenge. Guthrie explains that this
category involves mindsets that affect judgment.6 Based on the work of the
brilliant psychologists Kahneman and Tversky, he demonstrates with his own
clever experiments how a phenomenon such as "anchoring" can affect the
assessment of damages. 7 This work shows that when individuals are exposed
to a number that sets their thinking about an assessment as either high or low,
that number "anchors" their thinking by pulling their individual assessment in
that direction.
Attitudinal blinders are a different matter altogether. Guthrie presents
convincing evidence, as others have done, that a decision-maker's political bent
affects the assessment of issues in a case.8 He further acknowledges that that
same human frailty will affect any type of dispute resolution and thus endorses
types that are premised on agreement of the parties rather than judging at all. 9
Whether attitudinal blinders amount to "misjudging" at all is an interesting
question, in the absence of certainty about how disputes should be resolved.
Disputes are, by their nature, a controversy over values and preferences. This
response does not disagree with the attitudinal blinders section of Misjudging
and agrees with Guthrie's conclusion that this human characteristic underscores
the desirability of consensual resolution of agreements rather than litigation
whenever possible.
I.

A.

INFORMATIONAL BLINDERS REEVALUATED

Unexplored Implications of Informational Blinders

Guthrie begins his article with three studies that explore the tendency of
judges to "misjudge" because of their all-too-human informational blinders.' °
These informational blinders, he explains, prevent judges from being able to
6 Guthrie, supra note 1, at

429-40.

7 Id. at 430-31.
8 Id. at 440-46.
9 Id. at 450.

1 Id. at 421 n.2 (citing Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside
the JudicialMind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777 (2001); W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think
About Risk?, 1 AM. LAW & ECON. REv. 26 (1999); Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie &

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:500

disregard inadmissible evidence when making merit-based decisions."' For
example, many judges exposed to evidence that is inadmissible because of the
attorney-client privilege take that evidence into account to rule in a manner
inconsistent with ignoring the evidence.' 2 In other words, they cannot forget
the elephant that they have been told not to think about. 13 He distinguishes this
kind of "misjudging" from "bad judging" that results from behavior such as
corruption or abuse of power. 4 Guthrie's concept of misjudging is the unintentional tendency of honest judges to take forbidden information into account.
Guthrie observes that if judges were not prone to human error, there would
be no need for appellate courts. 5 In one sense this observation is correct, but
in another it is shortchanging the nature of the common law process. It is only
one function of appellate courts to reverse errors at trial where the judge failed
to apply existing law correctly. Another crucial function is to build upon
existing law in new applications
and to reevaluate existing law as policy dic16
tates with changing times.
It is nonetheless true that one function of appellate courts - and of legal
rules - is to force a conformity of practice on the trial courts. Not only do
appellate courts reverse errors of application to achieve such conformity, but
they also devise common law rules designed to achieve the just result in categories of cases. In this context, Guthrie's experiments on misjudging have an
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1251 (2005)).
11 Id.
12 Id. at 268-70.
13 This famous example refers to the inability of people to stop thinking about an elephant,
or sometimes a pink elephant, once the idea has been planted in their heads. The notable
linguist George Lakoff, the Richard and Rhonda Goldman Professor of Cognitive Science
and Linguistics at the University of California, Berkeley, describes the phenomenon as
follows:
When I teach the study of framing at Berkeley, in Cognitive Science 101, the first thing I do is I
give my students an exercise. The exercise is: Don't think of an elephant! Whatever you do, do
not think of an elephant. I've never found a student who is able to do this. Every word, like
elephant evokes a frame, which can be an image or other kinds of knowledge: Elephants are
large, have floppy ears and a trunk, are associated with circuses, and so on. The word is defined
relative to that frame. When we negate a frame, we evoke the frame.
GEORGE LAKOFF, DON'T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT!:
DEBATE

KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE

3 (2004).

14 Guthrie distinguishes "bad judging" in the work by Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83
TEX. L. REV. 431, 432-33 (2004). See note 8 and accompanying text in Guthrie, supra note
1.
15 Guthrie, supra note 1, at 421.
16 Consider, for example, famous cases such as MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E.

1050 (N.Y. 1916), or Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975). In MacPherson, Justice Cardozo (then Judge Cardozo on the New York Court of Appeals) reconsidered
the privity limitation established in Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1852),
in the context of the developing twentieth century marketing of goods such as automobiles,
and set the stage for modem products liability law. In Li, the California Supreme Court
reevaluated the policy arguments justifying the doctrine that contributory negligence completely bars claims in negligence, and thus set the stage for the nationwide movement toward
comparative negligence. These two cases dramatically illustrate the function of appellate
courts to reevaluate and develop the common law. They did not simply reverse "errors" of
the trial court in applying existing law.
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implication that his paper does not explore: they confirm that these rules of
evidence are wise ones. The judges who created these rules as a matter of
common law knew intuitively what modem psychology has proven empirically,
namely that certain matters must be excluded from evidence because of their
effect on judgment.
The crucial connection that is missing from Guthrie's discussion is that the
rules of exclusion are intended to prevent the jury - not the judge - from hearing these matters. The jury is the classic fact-finder, and when a judge rules
that a communication is privileged, or that a subsequent repair is inadmissible
as proof of prior negligence, the goal is to protect the jury as fact-finder from
hearing the prejudicial information. It is precisely because this information is
so powerful that it is excluded. When parties in litigation choose the judge as
fact-finder instead of a jury, they are doing so knowing that this advantage is
lost. The fact-finder can no longer be protected from knowing that an elephant
is in the room. 17 Strategic choices - between types of dispute resolution of
between types of fact-finders within the litigation model - are the privilege of
the parties and do not call into question the legitimacy of the process in themselves. The inability of humans to ignore an elephant in the room is simply one
factor among many for the parties to consider in determining strategy. The
strategist may simply intuit the prejudicial effect or may know of its documentation, but it remains simply a factor in the calculation and not reason to consider the system illegitimate, as the term "misjudging" suggests.
Guthrie's experiments on informational blinders do provide documentation of that prejudicial effect. The most obvious conclusion of these studies is
that it is wise for such information to be withheld from the jury. The inability
of a judge to withhold the information from his or her own ears is a separate
question. For the typical damages case, the parties may choose to waive a jury
for a more expeditious and cheaper bench trial. Guthrie's studies show that
such a waiver is ill-advised - at least for one side - when prejudicial evidence
may taint the judge's evaluation.
Consider the first experiment where Guthrie considers the blinder effect of
evidence of subsequent remedial measures. 8 The judges in the experimental
group in the study were exposed to the information that the defendant container
manufacturer in a product defect case has taken subsequent remedial measures
to prevent similar accidents in the future. They were asked to "rule" on the
admissibility of this evidence, and they properly excluded it as violative of the
rule against admission of such evidence. The judges in the control group were
not exposed to the evidence of the subsequent remedial measures and otherwise
had exactly the same evidence in the case before them as the experimental
group.' 9 The researchers documented the effect of the informational blinder
when the judges in the control group ruled in favor of the defendant at a rate
that was higher than the judges in the experimental group who were exposed to
the evidence of the subsequent remedial measure. The difference, which was
17 See supra note 13.
18 Guthrie, supra note 1, at 423-24.
19

Id. at 424.
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statistically significant, demonstrated that the "exposed" judges could not
ignore what they heard in the motion.2 °
The rule against the introduction of evidence of subsequent remedial measures is a common law rule that excludes remedial measures, such as repairs,
that were taken after an accident 2' for the purpose of preventing future injuries.
Thus, for example, if a manufacturer adds a device for the purpose of preventing a product from causing fires after the plaintiff has been burned in such a
fire, that subsequent measure is not admissible at trial. The rule has been codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 407:
When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, measures are taken that,
if taken previously, would have made the injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of subsequent measures in not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product, a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or
instruction. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
The reason for the rule is twofold. The first reason is most consistent with
Guthrie's example - the prejudicial effect. The evidence is likely to be taken
as an admission of negligence or defect even though it is not conclusive and
does not rule out the plaintiffs own negligence. The Advisory Committee to
the Federal Rule-of Evidence noted that such evidence is not inconsistent with a
mere accident or with contributory negligence. 22 As such, defendants should
prefer fact-finders who are not exposed to the evidence, such as juries. The
study that Guthrie cites would have done better to focus on this reason for the
rule when devising the experiment where the evidence of subsequent repair was
revealed to the fact-finding judges who then disproportionately acted on the
information.
Guthrie's thesis is undercut, however, by the second policy reason for the
rule against evidence of subsequent repair. This reason is a quite different one,
unrelated to its prejudicial value. The Advisory Committee further said that
Rule 407 is designed to encourage the "social policy of encouraging people to
take, or at least not discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance of
added safety."2 3 This policy justification is unrelated to getting the "right
result" between the particular parties in this dispute; it has another goal altogether. Therefore, as the next section explores, it is not at all clear that a result
that takes this factor into account is the "wrong" result as Guthrie claims, in the
sense that it does not necessarily reflect a fallacy in judging. The benefit to the
defendant from the exclusion of such evidence may be undeserved in the sense
of achieving the correct result between the two parties to the case. The larger
social goal that the rule seeks - encouragement of safety measures - does not
bear directly on the merits of the claim between the two parties in the dispute.

20

Id.

21

See, e.g., Rimkus v. Nw. Colo. Ski Corp., 706 F.2d 1060, 1064 (10th Cir. 1983).
R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note.

22 FED.
23

Id.
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The False Assumption of the "Wrong Result"

The underlying premise in Guthrie's argument is that informational blinders can produce the "wrong" result simply because of the human fallacies
inherent in all judging. 24 Even when honest judges seek to obtain the right
result, he posits, a psychological phenomenon such as an informational blinder
interferes with the process. 25 It is for this reason that Guthrie does not focus on
the possibility of a prejudicial effect of a rule, but simply in the existence of the
rule. Indeed, in the context of subsequent remedial repair, Guthrie does not
even cite the prejudicial prong of the rationale and concedes freely that the
thrust of the rule is the encouragement of repairs.
Guthrie then offers the experiment with the product defect case as an
example of the operation of an informational blinder on judges; once exposed
to the forbidden information, they disproportionately relied upon it.2 6 Implicit
in this conclusion is that the "right" result is the one dictated by the control
group. In the example of the manufacturer product defect case, the assumption
of the experimenters is that the "correct" result favored the plaintiff.2 7 Otherwise one would not call it "misjudging." The rule against the introduction of
the subsequent remedial measure, however, is not just targeted to avoid
"wrong" or even "unjust" results. The rule exists in part despite the fact that
excluding the evidence may lead to the wrong result.
Consider, for example, a case where a toddler plaintiff falls from a scenic
overlook because there was no protective railing. The fact that the defendant
subsequently installed a railing is not admissible because that fact would discourage defendants from taking such safety measures. The public safety issue
is more important than the possibility that the evidence may help probe whether
the absence of the railing was negligence that caused the toddler's accident.
Although the accident might have happened even in the absence of the defendant's negligence, it is unlikely that the toddler would be contributorily negligent. The reasons for excluding the evidence to support the toddler's case do
not relate to truth-finding. Rather, the defendant is offered the windfall of
being able to exclude this compelling evidence of its failure to use due care to
prevent the toddler's fall in the public place.
A defendant in such a case would be well-advised not to waive the jury
trial in order to take advantage of the rule. If the defendant fails to demand a
jury, however, it is not necessarily the "wrong" result for the defendant to lose
because of this evidence. The repairs may logically lead one to the conclusion
that the condition was an unsafe one at the time of the plaintiff's accident.
Guthrie concludes that it is "misjudging" for a judge in a bench trial to reach
this result, but that conclusion does not necessarily follow. It may be a different result from the one that a jury would reach if it has been protected from the
information of repair, but that information is excluded for reasons other than
the truth of whether the condition was unreasonably unsafe at the time of the
plaintiffs accident. The different result is not necessarily the wrong one.
24 Guthrie, supra note 1, at 429, 458.
25

Id. at 446.

Id. at 423-24.
27 Id. at 426-27.
26
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Quite to the contrary of Guthrie's conclusion, the "misjudging" result that
he criticizes may in fact be the "correct" result in terms of justice between these
two parties. Repairs may well be an indication that the previous condition was
an unsafe one and the plaintiff should recover. The plaintiff who loses because
of the rule excluding the evidence has been disadvantaged individually for the
sake of the greater good - the encouragement of repairs. Therefore, if the
defendant's attorney fails to take advantage of the rule that unjustifiably favors
her client for this reason, the defendant cannot complain that the result was the
"wrong" one with relation to these two parties.
The same reasoning applies to Guthrie's example of information protected
by the attorney-client privilege. As Guthrie acknowledges, the rule protecting
the jury from such information is premised on the policy of promoting communication.2 8 It is not designed to protect the parties from the unjust result in a
case. To the contrary, the policy is so strong that the rule persists despite its
function as an obstacle to just results in individual cases.
In his experiment, Guthrie and his colleagues "exposed" the experimental
group of judges to information that was fatal to the plaintiffs case but protected by attorney-client privilege. 29 A statistically significant number of
judges in the experimental group then held against the plaintiff on the substantive claim compared with the control group that was not exposed to the fatal
information that was protected by attorney-client privilege.3 ° In the experiment, the client essentially confesses to the attorney that he did not bargain for
a contract benefit that he is now claiming. 3 Guthrie properly cites the reason
for the privilege: encouragement of communication between attorneys and clients. 3 2 The policy reason for the rule is unrelated to truth-finding or justice
between two particular parties. Were the judges who were exposed to the fatal
information "misjudging" the case if they did justice between these two parties? This result did not destroy the rule nor adversely affect the behavior of
any future parties. How was it "misjudging" in any sense other than coming to
a different result that those unexposed to this very probative -information?
C. Blinders Off and On
It is fatal to Guthrie's argument about informational blinders that he
assumes that reaching a different result is "misjudging." It is misjudging only
in the sense of getting a different result from someone under the veil. The
experimental evidence proves that the rules are correct that such evidence
affects judgment, and therefore that juries should not hear such evidence if
there are societal reasons to encourage repairs or confidential disclosure. The
studies Guthrie employs do not prove, however, that a fact-finder who is privy
to the forbidden knowledge will reach an unjust result. It is very likely to be
the just result - simply a different one from the ignorant fact-finder.
28
29
30

31
32

Id. at 425.
Id. at 425-27.
Id. at 427.
Id. at 426.
See text accompanying id. at 425 n.30.
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Once the fact-finder has access to the forbidden information, is it wrong to
use it? Is it "misjudging" to reach the correct result in the individual case
simply because the defendant used the wrong litigation strategy to keep the
fact-finder from hearing the highly probative evidence that the defendant was
entitled to exclude for reasons other than justice between these parties? Guthrie's concept of "blinder" is better applied to the ignorant fact-finder in such
cases. The exclusion of the evidence is a blinder that is not justified in any
absolute sense. Why should the fact-finder be forbidden to see if the blinder is
off for a reason that is not the fault of the plaintiff or the court? Unlike the
basis for the exclusionary rule in criminal law, reliance on forbidden evidence
does not taint the civil law process if the defendant failed to protect itself by
demanding a jury. The defendant may have weighed many factors in the decision whether to demand a jury; such trial strategies do not taint the justice of
the result if the judge finds in favor of the plaintiff because of exposure to
evidence that the jury would not have seen.
Guthrie advocates the use of nonevaluative mediation as an alternative
method to dispute resolution in such a situation.3 3 Should the fact of repair or
confidential communication be available to the mediator? Imagine that we live
in an ideal world where a philosopher king resolves such disputes and rules of
evidence do not encourage undesirable behavior in actors (such as avoiding
subsequent repairs or discouraging communication between attorney and client). Would we allow the philosopher king to know about the repair or the
communication? I submit that we would - precisely because it is relevant to
the correct result between these two parties.
II.

ANCHORING STUDIES:

EMPIRICAL PROOF OF COMMON LAW WISDOM

The second part of Misjudging details empirical evidence of cognitive
blinders and the effect of this phenomenon on the resolution of civil disputes.34
The article explains how the psychological effect of "anchoring" affects the
way that decision-makers approach a numerical assessment.3 5 In the context of
civil litigation, the experiments ably demonstrate that anchoring can affect the
assessment of damages.
Although Guthrie concludes that this phenomenon contributes to his negative critique of "judging," this section reinforces the wisdom of the common
law rules on types of arguments that are permissible to juries.36 Specifically, it
provides further confirmation of the rules on the per diem form of argument in
personal injury cases. As explained below, per diem arguments are a form of
anchoring by plaintiffs' attorneys to encourage juries to give higher personal
injury verdicts. The common law rules developed in response to per diem
arguments are based upon the common law assumption that juries will be
unduly persuaded by such arguments. Although the rules were developed without the benefit of the empirical studies, the courts that developed the rules intuited the phenomenon of anchoring and constructed rules to combat the
33
34

Id.
Id.

at 452-54.
at 429-40.

35 Id. at 430-34.
36

Id.
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prejudicial effect. This part of Guthrie's article confirms that wisdom and does
not support his conclusion that litigation is less desirable in light of these psychological findings. To the contrary, these findings reconfirm the value of jury
trials.
A per diem argument is a tool of plaintiff's counsel to persuade the jury to
award a large sum for pain and suffering damages. The argument suggests a
method for quantifying damages based on a daily (or hourly or weekly) rate
and multiplying that number of units for a yearly rate, and then multiplying the
number of years of suffering. Calculating on the basis of per diem, which literally means "by the day," typically results in very large numbers. The jury is
lured into the large calculation by beginning with a small number to contemplate before counsel introduces the effect of the double multiplication. The
following example of this type of argument comes from Debus v. Grand Union
Stores of Vermont. 37 In this case, the plaintiff grocery shopper was permanently injured when she was crushed by falling boxes of pet food that a clerk
had stacked haphazardly on a pallet.38 Her attorney argued to the jury:
Now, let's just take one element. We have talked about pain and suffering. What
would be fair compensation for pain and suffering? Entirely up to you. I have a
suggestion. If you think about what it is like for Susanne to go through one day with
the pain that she has and think about what would be fair compensation for that one
day, what do you think it would be? Would it be $100 to go through that in a day?
Would it be $75? Would it be $50, $40?
Ladies and gentlemen, we want to be scrupulously fair about our request to you. So I
am going to suggest to you that you award Susanne $30 a day for the loss of those
three elements: pain and suffering, mental anguish, and loss of enjoyment of life.
That is $10 a day for each one. I put it to you for your consideration to follow that
through.
You would do it this way, there are 365 days a year. I am just going to put here pain
and suffering, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life. Now there are 365 days in a
year. And Susanne's six years she has already suffered in these ways and 29 more,
that is 35 years total that she should be compensated for. And if you multiply 35
times 365, there are 12,775 days. And if you multiply that figure by the $30 per day
I just suggested, it comes out to $383,250 - sorry. $383,250.
Now, another way of thinking of that is if you divide 35 years into this figure of
$383,250 it comes out to slightly under $11,000 a year. Maybe that would be a help
39
to think for you $11,000 a year to live the way she lives, to lose what she has lost.

There are variations on the per diem argument that also have the effect of

providing an anchor for the jury. One such variation is known as the "golden
rule" approach, where plaintiff's counsel asks jurors to award damages in an
amount they would want for their own suffering or its avoidance."0 Another
37 621 A.2d 1288 (Vt. 1993).
38

Id. at 1290.

39 Id. at 1295-96 (Allen, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis removed).
40 An example of such an argument is provided in Henker v. Preybylowski, 524 A.2d 455

(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987):
Remember the wisdom tooth, a little canker sore in your mouth. You can't get rid of it. You
may take Tylenol. Or take a fractured tooth, finger, a cut, a burn. What is pain worth for one
hour? You've gone to doctors and dentists. An anesthesiologist, you know how much he
charges just to limit or prevent pain during the course of an operation. You know how much a
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persuasive tool in the plaintiffs arsenal is the "job offer" argument, where
jurors are invited to think about a sum of money that they would accept in order
to trade places with the plaintiff and suffer the same pain and disability. That
daily rate is then multiplied to a large sum.4 1
Jurisdictions are divided as to whether to allow such arguments.4 2 The
debate centers on whether such calculations are prejudicial and based on argument rather than evidence. Some jurisdictions refuse to permit such arguments
because the suggestion of a formula produces an illusion of certainty and
because juries are misled and deceived by the effect of multiplication. Other
jurisdictions reason that defense counsel can anticipate such arguments and
counter them. Further, the judge can explain to juries the difference between
evidence and argument and can guide the jury to estimate the proper amount
based upon the evidence.
The evidence on anchoring in Guthrie's article provides an explanation for
why the per diem approach is favorable to plaintiffs. It permits the plaintiffs
counsel to present a sum that effectively anchors. The wisdom of the common
law is again confirmed by these studies. The rules surrounding per diem arguments and their cousins are based upon the common law assumption that juries
will be unduly persuaded by such arguments. Although the judicial authors of
these rules were not aware of the now relevant studies, they intuited the phenomenon of anchoring and provided sensible rules to govern per diem
arguments.
Far from leading to Guthrie's conclusion that the science undercuts the
civil damages system, it reinforces its wisdom. Juries are protected from the
full impact of anchoring arguments in ways that the judges were not protected
in the experiment.
III.

IMPLICATIONS FOR

DISPUTE

RESOLUTION:

REAFFIRMATION OF THE JURY

Ironically, Guthrie's article is a reaffirmation of the jury system, even
though its author came to a different conclusion that the evidence supports nonlitigation models of dispute resolution. It was his failure to account for the role
dentist charges to give a shot of Novocain so you don't feel pain for ten, fifteen minutes. How

much is that pain worth for one hour? When you get that hour, think about the thousands of
hours that Ken Henker has suffered pain just the last three years .... The jury is going to tell
how much is owed him for that pain, thousands of hours in the past and thousand of hours in the
future.
Id. at 458-59.
41 An example of the "job offer" approach is provided in Faught v. Washam, 329 S.W.2d

588 (Mo. 1959):
In considering what is an adequate sum for this young man, suppose I was to meet one of you
ladies on the street and I say to you, "I want to offer you a job and I want to tell you a little bit
about this job before you say you are going to accept it; one peculiar thing, if you take it you
have to keep it for the rest of your life, you work seven days a week, no vacations, work daytime
and night. The other thing is, you only get paid $3.00 a day. Here is your job - your job is to
suffer Mr. Faught's disability.
Id. at 601-02.
42 An example of one jurisdiction that has flip-flopped on the per diem rule is Kansas. See
Wilson v. Williams, 933 P.2d 757, 761 (Kan. 1997) (reversing its earlier prohibition of the
argument in Caylor v. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 374 P.2d 53 (Kan. 1962)).
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of juries - or for the option of juries, at least - that makes the difference. First,
the attitudinal blinders support the existence of a buffer between the person
who decides on the admissibility of the evidence and the fact-finder. That
would argue in favor of more juries or other methods of resolution where there
is more than one step in the proceeding.
Second, for cognitive blinders, notably anchoring, Guthrie's solution
appears unrelated to the problem. The danger of the "mental trick" that anchoring can play is like the per diem argument, and it can best be countered with
awareness and counter-argument in whatever method of adjudicated resolution
is adopted. Self-resolution of the conflict by the parties themselves, such as
settlement following nonevaluative mediation, would not appear to be immune
from this human fallacy any more than other types of resolution. Plaintiffs who
have no idea what a case is "worth" will be influenced by the anchor number
they hear - and perhaps even more so than participants with more access to
differing numbers.
The best case for Guthrie's conclusion is his account of attitudinal blinders.43 Judges and juries alike are certainly very human, and any litigant knows
well that the predisposition of the decision-maker will affect the disposition of
the dispute. Children apply that principle as soon as they figure out that they
should ask one parent or another, or perhaps even their grandparents, about
particular issues. The conclusion that Guthrie draws is that such predispositions result in "misjudging. ' '4" If that conclusion is shared by the reader, then
nonevaluative mediation - i.e., parties resolve their own disputes - may be the
right answer, as he suggests. But he concedes that there is no reason to think
that evaluative forms of nonlitigation dispute resolution will fare any better
than litigation in this regard.4 5
Ultimately, it is the legitimacy of the system used to resolve disputes that
is the issue rather than whether particular disputes are resolved in particular
ways. Consider a child's father who is "soft" on whether to comply with a
child's plea for designer jeans because of a predisposition based on his own
childhood experience, and the teen's mother who is "hard" on the subject for
her own personal reasons. Is one of these equal decision-makers more legitimate than the other for that reason? These are attitudinal blinders, but they do
not necessarily make the decision of either parent illegitimate or even
questionable.
Continuing the analogy, and moving from attitudinal blinders to cognitive
ones, consider the teen's plea for a higher allowance. The mother, but not the
father, hears about what other children are receiving - an anchor that causes
cognitive blinders. Is it less legitimate for a mother to decide on the teen's
allowance after she hears what other children receive than it is for the father to
decide the question without that anchoring information? In this situation, the
anchor might even be useful to the decision-maker. As long as the parents
understand that the anchoring affects the mother, the process does not seem
" Guthrie, supra note 1, at 440-46.
Id. at 446-48.
Id. at 456.
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tainted. This situation is the equivalent of the jurors who hear the per diem
argument from the plaintiffs attorney.
Continuing the analogy and moving to informational blinders, consider
these parents deciding on a teen's punishment for coming home late. The parents are aware that one of their older children became a problem on this subject
and for this reason they may decide to give a harsh punishment - longer
"grounding" - to this younger child in order to "nip the problem in the bud."
This is an informational blinder because the conduct of the previous child is
irrelevant to this child's conduct. Moreover, it is prejudicial to this child and
the conduct of the older sibling would not be admitted into evidence in either a
criminal or civil trial for that reason. But is the punishment less legitimate
because the informational blinder prejudiced the parents? Although such evidence would never support state punishment, we do not question it with respect
to parental authority because of our cultural concept of the legitimacy of this
decision-maker. It is not the blinders themselves that call into question the
legitimacy of the system. The parents are not "misjudging" despite their
blinders.
Historically, our culture has accepted the legitimacy of the system of judge
and jury to resolve civil disputes. The common law has devised rules that have
been confirmed by the empirical data as wise ones; juries should be protected
from information that triggers cognitive and informational blinders. Further,
litigants can protect themselves from the attitudinal blinders of judges through
the use of juries, when available. If litigants waive the right to a jury trial and
trust the judge as a decision-maker for strategic or economic reasons, that does
not change the legitimacy of the system even if the result changes. The legitimacy of this system remains unchallenged by the empirical evidence because
the evidence does not suggest that rank injustice pervades the land during those
instances when blinders - at least informational and cognitive ones - are at
play. There are many reasons to challenge the system for its cost, delay, and
trauma for the litigants, but the empirical evidence of blinders does not add
much to the indictment.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Guthrie makes an important and provocative contribution, but ultimately
he fails to make his case that blinders undercut the civil litigation model
because he fails to account for juries in that model. First, the informational
blinders argue in favor of a buffer between the adjudicator of the admissibility
of the evidence and the fact-finder. That evidence supports more juries or other
methods of resolution where there is more than one step in the proceeding.
Second, for cognitive blinders, Guthrie's solution appears unrelated to the
problem. Anchoring poses the danger of the "mental trick" on the fact-finder's
assessment of something like damages because the anchor pushes that assessment higher or lower than it would otherwise be. One trial equivalent is per
diem arguments in personal injury litigation, where the plaintiff's attorney suggests a method of calculating pain and suffering damages in a way that anchors
a high number. The danger of the "mental trick" that the argument can play
may be best countered with awareness and counter-argument. Parties' self-
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resolution would not appear to be immune from this human fallacy any more
than other types of resolution. Plaintiffs who have no idea what a case is
"worth" will be influenced by the anchor number they hear - and perhaps even
more so than participants with more access to differing numbers.
The best case for Guthrie's conclusion is attitudinal blinders. Judges certainly are very human and any litigant knows well that the predisposition of the
decision-maker will affect the disposition of the dispute. Children apply that
principle as soon as they figure out that they should ask one parent or another,
or perhaps even their grandparents, about particular issues. The implication
that Guthrie draws is that that blinder calls into question the legitimacy of the
system. If that conclusion is shared by the reader, then nonevaluative mediation - i.e., parties resolve their own disputes - may be the right answer, as he
suggests. But he concedes that there is no reason to think that evaluative forms
of nonlitigation dispute resolution will fare any better than litigation.
Misjudging makes a great contribution to the literature on empirical studies of fact-finding, and it serves well to confirm the wisdom of some common
law rules that protect juries from certain kinds of information that we now can
label as informational or cognitive blinders. The article does less well at its
stated goal of confirming the wisdom of methods of dispute resolution that are
alternatives to litigation. Although there are many other reasons to embrace
non-litigation models, 46 Guthrie's Misjudging article should be cited in a limited way. It does support the desirability of nonevaluative mediation to minimize the three types of blinders Guthrie catalogues, but it offers little to justify
the rejection of litigation in favor of other types of alternative dispute resolution. Perhaps its best contribution is to the general proposition that the law
should continue to struggle toward finding and implementing new ways of
resolving disputes that take into account our all-too-human fallacies.

46 See Sternlight, supra note 4.

